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Abstract
Although legislative actions and judicial decisions failed to spark the desired civil rights progress in the United
States or Northern Ireland, growing international pressures helped to reinforce the respective domestic civil
rights movements and served as an impetus for change in both. The United States began implementing new
policies regarding racial segregation in response to Cold War politics, while Northern Ireland experienced an
expansion of rights due in large part to the United Kingdom’s membership in the European Economic
Community and subsequent European Union. Civil rights progress in Northern Ireland also benefited from
American encouragement of peace and reconciliation. Thus, the relatively recent increase in interdependence
between nations both economically and politically has created a new sense of accountability among states.
Domestic repression has become an embarrassment in a global society that touts the benefits of democracy
and freedom, and thus states have taken greater care to solve internal problems of inequality.
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Introduction: 
 The United States and Northern Ireland share histories of minority repression and 
disenfranchisement.  African Americans within the United States as well as Catholics in 
Northern Ireland have lobbied for recognition and civil rights guarantees for years but 
have met with varied success.  In the United States, attempts to create social change via 
legislation and judicial decisions through the mid twentieth century, although promising, 
did not stimulate the desired progress.  These methods fell short, as did similar attempts 
in Northern Ireland through the 1960s.  Favorable court rulings for Catholics in Northern 
Ireland were few and far between, and at the same time, legislatures failed to address the 
gross inequalities between Catholics and their Protestant counterparts.  However, both 
populations have experienced an increase in rights over the last few decades and an 
important question to answer is how, in fact, did the changes come about?  What was the 
impetus?  This question is a valuable one because if a consistent model exists, then it can 
perhaps be applied to other countries experiencing civil rights inequalities in the hopes of 
instituting positive, lasting changes.   
Differing theories exist regarding the extension of civil rights to minority 
populations, but some, like the theory of strong active courts pushing for change, have 
been discredited, as the civil rights movement has met many barriers within the United 
States judicial system over the decades.  In the post-Civil War era of Reconstruction, 
African Americans lobbied for rights, but the movement for equality was a hard one to 
sell in the recently war-torn nation.  Northerners desired an end to the strife and generally 
looked the other way when literacy tests, poll taxes, and Jim Crow laws sprung up in the 
South.  In the desperate search for equal treatment, African Americans took their cases of 
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discrimination to court.  However, the unsympathetic courts often ruled against 
recognizing black rights.  Plessy v. Ferguson, decided in 1896, was a detrimental 
decision for activists.  The case focused on the legality of separating Louisiana railroad 
cars into white and black compartments, and the ruling approved “separate but equal” 
spheres.  With this decision the court system blatantly failed to recognize the equality of 
white Americans and African Americans.  Not only was the ruling itself dubious, but the 
court failed even to enforce the equal nature of facilities.  Robert McCloskey writes in 
The American Supreme Court that “the facilities [of African Americans] did not have to 
be very equal to pass the Court’s mild inspection.”1  This lack of concern for minority 
populations served to undermine the Court’s further decisions on rights related issues.   
In Plessy v. Ferguson, the Court missed an opportunity to set a precedent for civil 
rights, but even when the Court issued a promising decision, success did not necessarily 
follow.  Gerald Rosenberg in The Hollow Hope highlights the lack of influence court 
decisions in the United States actually had on the rights movement.  He points to Brown 
v. Board, the case that ended with “a unanimous Supreme Court clearly and 
unequivocally holding that state-enforced segregation of public schools was 
unconstitutional” and ordering that it be ended “with all deliberate speed,” to showcase 
how, even with good intentions, the U.S. courts lack the necessary means of 
implementation to see their rulings through to fruition.2  He further emphasizes that 
“despite Brown, public schools in the South remained pristinely white, with only one in a 
hundred black children in elementary and secondary school with whites by 1964, a 
                                                 
1
 McCloskey, Robert.  The American Supreme Court. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005. p. 141. 
2
 Rosenberg, Gerald.  The Hollow Hope.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991. p. 43. 
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decade after the ruling.”3  Although the courts tried to create change, their rhetoric failed 
to mobilize legislators as for ten years after the ruling the executive branch along with 
Congress did little to address the system’s inequalities.  “The court spoke alone.  Yet 
words are not action.”4  Rosenberg disputes the conventional wisdom that the courts were 
an important factor in this movement towards equality. 
 The Catholic population of Northern Ireland has also seen repression of rights by 
the courts.  As Kevin Boyle writes in Law and State: The Case of Northern Ireland, “the 
Roman Catholics distrust[ed] the whole legal system as the puppet of the Unionists,” and 
thus “the civil rights leaders failed to make any sustained attempt to obtain a legal 
remedy for their grievances.”5  Not only was the legal system inhospitable to the Roman 
Catholics, but even when select civil rights cases were actually brought before the Court, 
they met with defeat.  The Republican Clubs Case of 1967, which challenged the law 
banning the existence of Republican clubs (groups supporting a united Ireland and equal 
rights), failed to overturn the law and proved “to the minority community that they could 
expect no aid from Britain in their struggle for what they regarded as their legitimate civil 
rights.”6  Unfortunately, the Roman Catholics could find no recourse within the 
Protestant-controlled court system of Northern Ireland.    
Although one may look to legislation and constitutional amendments instead of 
dynamic courts as key factors in promoting the rights movement in the United States, 
these avenues have their barriers as well.  Looking back to the Fourteenth Amendment, 
                                                 
3
 The Hollow Hope, p. 74. 
4
 The Hollow Hope, p. 40. 
5
 Boyle, Kevin, Tom Hadden, and Paddy Hillyard. The Case of Northern Ireland. London: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1975. p. 7, 10. Questia, 17 Nov. 2007. 
<http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=11035641>  
6
 The Case of Northern Ireland, p. 15. 
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which was supposed to guarantee equal protection for African Americans, one sees initial 
failure.  Although Congress amended the Constitution to extend freedoms to minority 
populations, the amendment suffered from poor implementation, rejection by certain 
states, and even essential nullification by the Supreme Court with the ruling on Plessy v. 
Ferguson.  As Michael Perry notes in We the People: The Fourteenth Amendment and 
The Supreme Court, “The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to 
eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the States.”7  The 
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, were not always enforced: 
“Although the amendment guarantees both substantive rights and procedural fairness, the 
three great clauses of Section 1 do not specify either the rights protected or the 
procedures required. While Section 5 grants Congress the power to enforce Section 1 by 
‘appropriate legislation,’ it is silent on how, if at all, the federal structure of the 
government limits that power.”8  Due to these silences and southern white resistance, 
although the amendment was enacted, it failed to achieve equal rights for African 
Americans.   
Similarly, the Fifteenth Amendment also failed to live up to its promise of 
equality and enfranchisement of black Americans.  With the case Giles v. Harris and 
subsequent Giles v. Teasley in the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court failed to 
endorse black suffrage and allowed the state of Alabama to deny African Americans the 
right to vote.  In its decision on Giles v. Harris, the court recognized that the “the refusal 
                                                 
7
 Perry, Michael J. We the People: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999. p. 90, Questia, 17 Dec. 2007. 
<http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=79128582>  
8
 Bond, James E.  No Easy Walk to Freedom: Reconstruction and the Ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997. p. 1. Questia, 17 Dec. 2007. 
<http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=27469215> 
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to register the blacks was part of a general scheme to disfranchise them [in Alabama],” 
but ruled that “the circuit court has no constitutional power to control [Alabama’s] action 
by any direct means.”9  The court agreed that black Americans were being mistreated, but 
refused to rule in their favor because they could not guarantee the enforcement of a 
decision favorable to the black minority.  Thus, they acquiesced in the continuous 
repression.  The ruling went on to state, “The great mass of the white population intends 
to keep the blacks from voting . . . unless we are prepared to supervise the voting in that 
state by officers of the court, it seems to us that all that the plaintiff could get from equity 
would be an empty form.”  Instead of taking whatever action it could, the court did 
nothing.   
Legislation in Northern Ireland did not provide reliable guarantees for citizens of 
the minority population either.  As Kevin Boyle notes in The Case of Northern Ireland: 
The Government of 1920 Act made specific provision to that effect, 
notably in declaring void any law enacted by the new parliament which 
gave preference, privilege or advantage or imposed disability or 
disadvantage on account of religious belief. The reality was otherwise. 
The proud promise of a 'Protestant parliament for a Protestant people' was 
effectively fulfilled through the continued stranglehold of the exclusively 
Protestant Unionist Party in the parliament at Stormont.10 
Northern Ireland lacked legitimate guarantees for minority rights, and Boyle suggests that 
this discrimination against Catholics also had an effect on the frequency as well as the 
                                                 
9
 “Supreme Court of the United States. Jackson W. Giles, Appellant, v. E. Jeff Harris, William A. Gunter, 
Jr., and Charles B. Teasley, Board of Registrars of Montgomery County, Alabama.” Virginia Law Review. 
(1903): p. 94-5, 99. JSTOR. University of Pennsylvania Lib., Philadelphia, PA.  15 Mar. 2008. 
<http://www.jstor.org>  
10
 The Case for Northern Ireland, p. 7. 
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outcome of court cases.  “The most obvious explanation for this failure of law and 
lawyers was the absence of any formal guarantees in the British and Northern Irish 
constitution of basic civil rights, [rights to freedom of assembly and freedom of speech,] 
and the consequent lack of any tradition of civil rights litigation.”11  He goes on to state 
that although “Unionist practices were a direct or indirect infringement of the 
constitutional guarantees against discrimination in the Government of Ireland Act, no 
serious legal challenge to the Unionist regime was mounted.”12  As in the United States, 
the government of Northern Ireland did not fully support or implement minority rights.  
 With the events surrounding Blood Sunday in 1972, it became even clearer that 
the law was not an effective means of protection for the minority.  As a peaceful march 
for civil rights formed on January 30th, British soldiers shot into the mass of people for 
disputed reasons, killing thirteen unarmed civilians and wounding others.  Dermont P.J. 
Walsh notes in Bloody Sunday and the Rule of Law in Northern Ireland, “the failure to 
prosecute those responsible [for Bloody Sunday] inflicted irreparable damage on the rule 
of law.”13  He goes on to say, “A crushing blow was dealt to the nationalists’ confidence 
in the capacity of the law to protect them and their lives against the oppressive policies 
and strategies of a hostile state and its armed forces.  Any vestige of legitimacy the state 
might have held for them was dissipated.”14  One organizer of the movement, Finbar 
O’Kane, expressed his distress by questioning, “What on earth will happen to us all 
now?”15  The situation was dire, and an inquiry into the events left many feeling 
                                                 
11
 The Case of Northern Ireland, p. 10. 
12
 The Case of Northern Ireland, p. 10. 
13
 Walsh, Dermont P.J. Bloody Sunday and the Rule of Law in Northern Ireland. Dublin: Gill & Macmlan, 
2000. p. 216. 
14
 Bloody Sunday and the Rule of Law in Northern Ireland. p. 216. 
15
 Winchester, Simon. “13 Killed as Paratroops Break Riot.” Guardian. 31 Jan. 1972.  20 Mar. 2008. 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/1972/jan/31/bloodysunday.northernireland> 
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hopeless.  The Los Angeles Times reported, “Britain’s Lord Chief Justice absolves the 
army of wrongdoing . . . and Ulster Roman Catholics, from moderate to militant, were . . 
. vehement in denouncing [the decision] as a whitewash.”16  In this situation, as in 
previous ones in Northern Ireland, Catholics had no recourse against the system of 
repression; the laws simply did not protect their rights.   
 The cases of the United States and Northern Ireland highlight the failure of both 
judicial decisions and legislative actions in creating civil rights protections for minority 
populations.  However, a differing theory, one that emphasizes international pressure as 
the impetus for change, shows how success was ultimately achieved.  The following 
section elaborates on this topic and illustrates how the civil rights movement in each 
location remained at a standstill until necessary international pressures pushed the 
movements forward.     
 
Argument: 
An alternative theory, as mentioned above, regarding the progress minority 
populations in both the United States and Northern Ireland have seen in regards to the 
area of civil rights, is that growing international pressures helped to reinforce the 
respective domestic civil rights movements and served as an impetus for change.  The 
United States began implementing new policies regarding racial segregation in response 
to Cold War politics, while Northern Ireland experienced an expansion of rights due in 
large part to the United Kingdom’s membership in the European Economic Community 
                                                 
16
 Nossiter, Bernard. "'Bloody Sunday' Inquiry Absolves British Troops in 13 Irish Deaths." Los Angeles 
Times (1886-Current File)  [Los Angeles, Calif.] 20  Apr. 1972, a4. ProQuest Historical Newspapers Los 
Angeles Times (1881 - 1986). ProQuest.  University of Pennsylvania Lib., Philadelphia, PA.  29 Mar. 
2008. <http://www.proquest.com/> 
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and subsequent European Union.  Civil rights progress in Northern Ireland also benefited 
from American encouragement of peace and reconciliation.  Thus, the relatively recent 
increase in interdependence between nations both economically and politically has 
created a new sense of accountability among states.  Domestic repression has become an 
embarrassment in a global society that touts the benefits of democracy and freedom, and 
thus states have taken greater care to solve internal problems of inequality.   
 
The United States 
   
Although international institutions, prominent world actors, and even developing 
nations have pressured for rights progress in recent decades, that has not always been the 
circumstance.  In past centuries, states were either left to deal with these issues 
domestically, or sometimes, as was the case with the colonial movement, nations were 
actually encouraged to continue discriminating without interference.  It was merely seen 
as the norm, and oftentimes, colonization was deemed “the white man’s burden.”  When 
war erupted in the Philippines in the late nineteenth century, “some white Americans 
were troubled by the course of the war . . . but many openly accepted it as one of the 
unfortunate burdens of civilization.”17  Because England had already sprinted to colonize 
the third world, there was no pressure for Americans to consider the rights of the native 
populations; there was only the drive to colonize faster.  “U.S. policy toward its new 
colonies abroad after 1899 derived directly from its prior policies toward Native 
Americans, . . . and Roosevelt wrote to a friend that if whites were ‘morally bound to 
                                                 
17
 Borstelmann, Thomas.  The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global 
Arena. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001. p. 17. 
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abandon the Philippines, we were also morally bound to abandon Arizona to the 
Apaches.’ ”18  There existed a clear sense that these actions were not only acceptable, but 
necessary.  The natives owed a debt to the settler for showing them civilization.  
The Civil War period in the United States was similar to that of colonization as 
the U.S. felt international pressure to continue its repressive behaviors.  While on a tour 
of the United Kingdom in 1853, the husband of Harriet Beecher Stowe addressed an 
audience in Glasgow and said, “In this country,” referring to Great Britain, “is the great 
market for American cotton; and it is cotton which sustains American slavery.”  Instead 
of merely touting the ills of slavery, Professor Stowe implicated a separate nation in the 
act and cited its poor influence on U.S. behaviors.   An observer remarked, “It is not 
pleasant to hear from Professor Stowe that the price of a slave, who was formerly worth 
$100, has risen through our demand for cotton, to £300.  It is not pleasant to think that 
the moral sense and judgment of any portion of our countrymen are under coercion by 
commercial interests.”19  Regular citizens appeared perturbed as Professor Stowe 
highlighted the fact that although Englishmen did not necessarily own slaves themselves, 
they were in fact propagating the institution of slavery by demanding cotton imports.  
Pressure from England to deliver the commodity combined with the economic incentives 
of the transaction encouraged the business of slavery. 
 American citizens also cited English traditions of rule in order to build support for 
the argument for slavery.  One letter to the editor of the New York Daily Times in 1854 
stated that “Negro slavery is the basis and foundation of Democracy, without which it 
                                                 
18
 The Cold War and The Color Line, p. 16. 
19
 "Cotton and Uncle Tom." New York Daily Times (1851-1857)  [New York, N.Y.] 6  May 1853, 
2. ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851 - 2004). ProQuest. University of 
Pennsylvania Lib., Philadelphia, PA. 15 Feb. 2008. <http://proxy.library.upenn.edu:2100/> 
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cannot exist.  Witness Europe.  It is as essential to Democracy as pauperism is to 
Aristocracy.  One cannot exist without the other.”20  There existed little outside pressure 
to improve the rights of citizens.  It seemed as though England, and other nations for that 
matter, had no reason to support civil rights across the ocean.  Not only did England 
benefit from the cotton trade, but its class-based system and historical feudal hierarchy 
also left little room for the British to claim moral superiority or insist on an end to the 
abuses of African Americans.  Another article, abolitionist in nature, asked in the New 
York Daily Times in 1854, “Will not the Americans of the North heartily join in the good 
work [to end slavery]?  Will not England?—she who particeps criminis—nobly lend a 
helping hand?”21  This writer recognized that England was instead another factor 
encouraging this social ill.  And as the Civil War began, Southerners continued to look to 
the international community to validate and support its actions.  The Christian Recorder, 
an African American newspaper, lamented the existence of international support for 
slaveholders in 1861: “The French ultramontane press, true to its instincts, sympathizes 
with the South.”22      
The events of the Civil War and colonization provide insights as to how 
international pressures, regardless of motives, can affect the domestic policy of a nation, 
and one sees a similar trend with the events of World War II.  The Second World War 
                                                 
20
 “Philosophy of Slavery: A new Revelation--Position of the South--Nature of the Issue." New York Daily 
Times (1851-1857)  [New York, N.Y.] 22  Nov. 1854, 3. ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York 
Times (1851 - 2004). ProQuest.  University of Pennsylvania Lib., Philadelphia, PA. 15 Feb. 
2008. <http://proxy.library.upenn.edu:2100/> 
21
 "American Slavery: The African Race in the United States. Number Two." New York Daily Times (1851-
1857)  [New York, N.Y.] 12  Apr. 1854, 2. ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851 - 
2004). ProQuest.  University of Pennsylvania Lib., Philadelphia, PA. 15 Feb. 2008. 
<http://proxy.library.upenn.edu:2100/> 
22
 “The Press of England and France on the American Civil War.” The Christian Recorder.  [Philadelphia, 
PA.]  29 June 1861.  Accessible Archives.  University of Pennsylvania Lib., Philadelphia, PA.  18 Feb. 
2008. <www.accessible.com>  
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demanded much from the United States, including full mobilization of the economy and 
the presentation of a united front.  In order to achieve these goals, some racial differences 
had to be pushed to aside.  In The Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of Racial 
Equality in America, Phillip Klinkner and Rogers Smith contend that “wartime changes 
eroded the color line.  Tight labor markets, pressure from the FEPC, and growing black 
demands increasingly opened up jobs to blacks,” but they also note that “many white 
workers were less than happy about such changes.”23  The economy had to operate at its 
maximum potential, but racial discrimination did not end overnight.  Still, the pressure to 
win the war, from the Americans, the British, the French, and Allies the world over, 
called for a degree of disregard for racial prejudices.     
At first, however, this shift from repression of black Americans to near 
acceptance in certain instances was difficult to see.  In 1942 the Office of Facts and 
Figures “conducted a survey of New York blacks on the war effort and found a rich 
reservoir of resentment.  Many blacks felt they were worse off since the start of the war.  
Fully 38 percent said that the country should concentrate on spreading democracy at 
home rather than defeating the Axis.”24  But by 1943, Time magazine reported that “U.S. 
citizens are fighting World War II with much less hysteria, many fewer violations of civil 
rights than during World War I, concluded the unsparing American Civil Liberties 
Union.”25  As Penny Von Eschen notes in Race Against Empire, “The global dynamic 
unleashed by World War II brought [civil rights] to the forefront of black American 
                                                 
23
 Klinkner, Philip A. with Rogers M. Smith.  The Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of Racial 
Equality in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999. p. 171. 
24
 The Unsteady March , p. 172. 
25
 “Report.” Time. 26 Jul. 1943. Time Magazine. 15 Mar. 2008. 
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,802854,00.html> 
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politics and animated political discourse at an unprecedented level.”26  New civil rights 
groups sprouted up, and existing ones grew.  “Between 1939 and 1945, NAACP 
membership grew nearly tenfold from fifty-four thousand to more than five hundred 
thousand, giving the organization its first mass base, [and] . . . along with blacks, the war 
prompted a growing number of white liberals to step up their civil rights efforts.”27  
Although full equality was still elusive, real progress was not.     
  In order to maintain the united front necessary to win the war, “the federal 
government made some efforts . . . to back up its rhetoric and to protect and extend the 
rights of blacks.”28  Congress battled the white primaries, while the government 
encouraged Americans to support their own.  As Joe Louis prepared for his rematch with 
Max Schmeling, Roosevelt told him, “Joe, we need muscles like yours to beat Germany,” 
and once he won, the head of the New Deal’s National Recovery Administration reported 
that “there should be just as much pride in their progress and prowess under our system 
as in the triumph of any other American.  For all their misfortunes and shortcomings they 
are our people.”29  By 1947, average white Americans also considered Jackie Robinson 
as one of their own, and cheered his successes on the baseball diamond.  However, at 
times the U.S. government did fall short of its promises, and portions of the American 
public failed to notice.  Lynchings still occurred in the South after the war, and the 
President’s Committee on Civil Rights found that “the white population can threaten and 
                                                 
26
 Von Eschen, Penny M.  Race Against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism 1937-1957. Ithaca: 
University of Cornell Press, 1997. p. 7. 
27
 The Unsteady March, p. 166-7. 
28
 The Unsteady March, p. 173. 
29
 The Unsteady March, p. 142-3. 
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do violence to the minority member with little or no fear of legal reprisal.”30  Even so, the 
longstanding racial hierarchies were becoming increasingly unstable.  
Yet because the United States was fighting a war of global scope, its racist 
policies did attract scrutiny.  Enemies of the U.S., namely Japan and Germany, pointed to 
the inequalities perpetuated in America and used this racism to fuel their propaganda 
machines.  The Unsteady March highlights the effects of this scrutiny: “Previously, the 
department [of Justice] had claimed that lynching was simply not a federal crime, but the 
coming of war required a change in policy.  Occurring shortly after Pearl Harbor, Axis 
propagandists broadcast details of the incident around the world.  In particular, the 
Japanese used the incident to warn Asians of how Western ‘democracies’ treated non-
whites.”31  The international community took notice of the fact that elevated American 
rhetoric about freedom and democracy did not necessarily match with the nation’s 
domestic policies and actions.   “Postindependence India became one of the most vocal 
international critics of Jim Crow.”32  One commentator noted:  
Both America and Britain lack the moral basis for engaging in this war 
unless they put their own houses in order, while making a fixed 
determination to withdraw their influence and power both from Africa and 
Asia, and remove the color bar.  They have no right to talk about 
protecting democracies and protecting civil and human freedom until the 
canker of white supremacy is destroyed in its entirety.33 
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Indians and Japanese alike also resented the existing immigration restrictions against 
their entry into the United States.  For these reasons, the U.S. saw its international 
reputation fading in some eyes.  However, the whole of the international community did 
not speak out against the internal abuses in America.  New York Post correspondent 
Walter White “found ample evidence that the U.S. command discriminated against black 
soldiers in Britain, [and that] British authorities generally condoned miscarriages of 
justice.”34  Although the U.S. was trying to institute change, the international pressure 
was not complete.    
 Events following World War II show how African Americans, themselves, turned 
to the international community to locate support for equal rights.  With the advent of the 
postwar anticolonial movement, African Americans “argued that their struggles against 
Jim Crow were inextricably bound to the struggles of African and Asian people for 
independence.”35  They saw a reflection of their struggle in the international arena and 
called for equality and fair treatment of their race.  International equality was highlighted 
because, as Tom Mboya, a Kenyan politician, stated, “Africans are highly conscious of 
the plight of black America, and they will be suspicious of the intentions of American 
foreign policy until they are convinced that the goal of American domestic policy is 
social justice for all.”36  African Americans believed that this focus on the international 
image of the U.S. would stir the government to act.  However, the movement ultimately 
fell far short of its goals in the late 1940s.  As Penny M. Von Eschen details in Race 
                                                 
34
 Rising Wind, p. 96. 
35
 Race Against Empire, p. 2. 
36
 Mboya, Tom. "The American Negro Cannot Look to Africa for an Escape :Africa is no escape." New 
York Times (1857-Current file)  [New York, N.Y.] 13 Jul. 1969, p. 1. ProQuest Historical Newspapers The 
New York Times (1851 - 2004). ProQuest. University of Pennsylvania Lib., Philadelphia, PA. 15 Feb. 
2008. <http://proxy.library.upenn.edu:2100/> 
Escoffery 18 
Against Empire, “The 1950s eclipse of 1940s anticolonialism had profound implications 
for the politics of the black American community as questions concerning political, 
economic, and social rights in an international context were neglected in favor of an 
exclusive emphasis on domestic political and civil rights.”37  International pressures are 
important for creating civil rights progress, but in this instance the international pressures 
from African colonies were fairly weak and negligible.  Domestic organizing and Cold 
War international factors would prove more effective in the next decade.  In the 
anticolonial movement, African Americans were also fighting for rights on a global, not 
national scale, which may have been too large for the struggling movement.  Although 
the movement did “shape black American politics and the meaning of racial identities 
and solidarities,” the fact that they were trying to “demand a genuine transformation of 
global power relations” worked against the goal of African American enfranchisement. 38  
Yet though there was no immediate success in helping American blacks win civil rights, 
the anticolonial movement did serve to further inspire the population of African 
Americans.   
With the advent of the Cold War, race relations became a matter of national 
security, and leaders, under pressure from the international community, struggled to 
create domestic civil rights progress.  Americans realized both the importance of the issue 
as well as the difficulties inherent in change.  The New York Times reported in 1948 that, 
“In its leading editorial, ‘The South and Truman,’ today’s Athens Banner-Herald, a 
Democratic paper since 1832, called for and end to the ‘cold war’ on the civil rights issue 
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‘before this question eventually destroys unity at a time of national peril.’ ”39  This shows 
that even Southerners were concerned about the race question.  Some called for equal 
rights, though others doubted that they would come to pass.  Some, like the American 
Civil Liberties Union, even believed that the Cold War would further chip away at the 
few rights African Americans held.  The ACLU issued a statement in 1949 saying that 
“civil rights in this country [are now] in greater danger than at any time in the last 
twenty-nine years because of ‘imagined insecurity’ in the face of the cold war with 
Russia . . . fear of war, Communist expansion and espionage [have] helped create in the 
United States a ‘dominant spirit’ of ‘nervous conservatism’ and [sparked the] failure of 
Congress to enact any civil rights measure.”40  The organization believed that liberties 
were threatened but also noted that “the Truman Administration’s civil rights program 
shows increasing vitality, though bogged down in Congress at the moment . . . [and] also, 
on the international front the United Nations [has] for the first time in history laid a 
working basis between the nations and peoples for enforceable civil rights and 
international freedom of communication.”41  The group recognized the importance of the 
international community and cited its potential positive effects on the domestic rights 
situation.   
Since becoming a signatory for the United Nations Commission of Human Rights 
on December 10, 1946, the United States found itself committed to supporting human 
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rights abroad; but with this responsibility, it became increasingly important that the U.S. 
promote rights domestically as well.  The council was said to “encourage the forces of 
egalitarianism around the globe,”42 but one criticism of the commission was that some of 
the member states actually had poor human rights records themselves.  Although these 
critiques were mostly directed at countries like the People’s Republic of China, Cuba, 
and Pakistan, the U.S. was not immune to disapproving remarks.  The U.N.’s June 7, 
1949 memorandum entitled The Main Types and Causes of Discrimination called for the 
protection of minorities, and by doing so, highlighted the shortcomings of the U.S. in the 
area of individual rights.  The document stated, “Protection of minorities is the protection 
of non-dominant groups which . . . wish in general for equality of treatment with the 
majority . . . the characteristics meriting such protection are race, religion and 
language.”43  The document also stated that “on the basis of this ethical concept of the 
dignity of the human person, the following principles are founded: (a) the principle of 
individual freedom, and (b) the principle of equality of all human beings before the 
law.”44  The United States, however, with its active Jim Crow laws and separate but equal 
policies, was not living up to this ideal of minority protection, and leaders recognized 
this.  President Truman even warned Americans that “their confidence in the U.N. cannot 
be absolute . . . [and that] it is not true that every big and little wrong anywhere must be 
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righted before for the world can have peace.”45  Although the system of international 
cooperation seemed to be off to a rocky start, it had started nonetheless.   
Throughout the Cold War, the United Soviet Socialist Republic continued to 
criticize the racial tensions existent in the United States.  The USSR pointed to the 
disadvantaged population of African Americans as proof that American democracy had 
severe faults.  Communist leaders wanted to embarrass America in the global arena, and 
as the spread of communism became an increasing threat, the United States began to 
dismantle its domestic racist policies and laws.  This change was not immediate.  It 
occurred over time, with a climax in the 1960s and the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965.  The U.S. felt the pressure of the international 
community and responded by implementing appropriate change.  Mary Dudziak, in her 
article “Brown as a Cold War Case,” highlights the effects of the Cold War on American 
judicial proceedings.  She states, “the Justice Department briefs gave only one reason for 
the government’s participation in [the Brown case]: segregation harmed U.S. foreign 
relations, . . . and, as the United States argued in the Brown amicus brief . . . ‘racial 
discrimination furnishes grist for the Communist propaganda mills, and it raises doubts 
even among friendly nations as to the intensity of our devotion to the democratic  
faith.’ ”46  The United States realized that “discrimination at home must be fought 
because it undermined the legitimate U.S. leadership of the ‘free world.’ ”47  In its 
mission to win the Cold War and become the world hegemon, the United States could not 
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afford to have a tarnished image.  As President Truman said, “Our foreign policy is 
designed to make the United States an enormous, positive influence for peace and 
progress throughout the world.  We have tried to let nothing, not even extreme political 
differences between ourselves and foreign nations, stand in the way of this goal.  But our 
domestic civil rights shortcomings are a serious obstacle.”48  International cooperation 
and adherence to basic human rights had become key.   
U.S. Department of State records of the period highlight the concern of rising 
Soviet power and discuss the methods employed by the USSR to achieve the desired 
power.  One declassified document states: 
The general Soviet strategy for carrying on the world struggle in the 
present phase rests on two propositions . . . the second [of which] is that 
the world position and power of the “imperialist” states can be 
undermined by a persistent and aggressive campaign waged by methods 
short of war—political struggle, economic and scientific competition, 
subversion.  Political struggle takes the form of a constant agitation 
designed to capture and organize in broad mass movements the sentiments 
which focus on the great issues of the current period—peace, 
disarmament, anticolonialism, social justice, economic development.  By 
manipulating these issues and by dramatizing the growth of Soviet power, 
the Soviets are also trying to align the governments of the under-
developed and uncommitted states with the Bloc, and against the West.  
The Soviet leaders hope that the result will be a progressive isolation and 
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loss of influence for the Western powers, divisions among them, and a 
decline in their ability to deal effectively with threats to their interests. 
This is what the Soviets mean by "peaceful coexistence"—a strategy to 
defeat the West without war.49 
The U.S. government was aware of the tactics of the Soviet Union, and realized that it did 
not want the Soviets to capitalize on the racial tension existent in the United States.  
American intelligence worried about the possibility of a fifth column growing within the 
nation and compromising national security.   
 To guard against this scenario, the Federal Bureau of Investigation drafted memos 
regarding the potential threat of civil rights groups.  In one such 1963 document, the 
Bureau reported, “Although evidence to date is lacking which would show the black 
nationalist movement in this country is either under foreign control or direction, it must 
be recognized that a real potential for foreign exploitation exists and presents a definite 
threat to our internal security.”50  Not only did intelligence officials worry about foreign 
control of groups, but they also were concerned that communists, American or otherwise, 
would infiltrate and lead these communities to revolt.  One report notes, “Communists 
and other subversives and extremists strive and labor ceaselessly to precipitate racial 
trouble and to take advantage of racial discord in this country.  Such elements were active 
in exploiting and aggravating the riots, for example, in Harlem, Watts, Cleveland, and 
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Chicago.”51  Race relations had become an issue vital to the nation’s security.  The new, 
political consequences for discriminating against African Americans came to be a central 
concern of American leaders.  As late as 1967, a White House memorandum explored the 
potential effects of Cuban involvement in Black Power movements.52   
Not only was the United States concerned about the foreign exacerbation of 
tensions during the Cold War; it was also concerned with its legitimacy and reputation 
around the world.  As the book Race Against Empire notes, “discrimination at home [had 
to] be fought because it undermined the legitimate U.S. leadership of the ‘free world,’ . . . 
[and for that reason] the Truman administration and the State Department embarked on 
far-reaching attempts to shape Asian and African perceptions of American ‘race 
relations.’ ”53  The United States was supposed to be the leader of the free world, and for 
that to be the case, it had to lead a free nation first and foremost.  The U.S. was criticized 
for human rights abuses, and this criticism went well into the 1980s.  In 1987, the New 
York Times wrote that the U.S.S.R. reported “American agents had developed a lethal gas 
that kills black people but not whites.”54  The “chief editor of the official Novosti press 
said he did not recall the article, but if it existed, it probably had been based on Western 
press reports.  [He] went on to talk about massacres of American Indians [and] 
mistreatment of Japanese-Americans in World War II . . . arguing that development of an 
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ethnic weapon would not be inconsistent with American history.”55  Enemies of the U.S. 
were quick to cite past discriminations, and even quicker to claim new ones.  Competing 
against these sorts of allegations, the U.S. had to take actions that countered the claims. 
 The U.S. was so concerned with its image abroad that President Lyndon Johnson, 
in a telephone conversation with Roy Wilkins in 1964, asked whether it would be 
appropriate for the government to appoint black Americans as ambassadors to African 
countries.  The question was whether this would show that the U.S. conformed to 
stereotypes or that it supported equal opportunities.  A short excerpt of the transcript 
follows:  
President: Now let me ask you this. They tell me that we shouldn't send a 
Negro to an African country as an ambassador. Is that true? 
Wilkins: The Africans have strenuously denied it when we have 
confronted them with it. I don't know whether it's true or not. All I can say 
is that diplomatically they have said no. Some of them have been 
vehement in denying it. Others have said this is silly. And I don't know 
exactly how they feel about it. I would say that if you made a uniform 
practice of assigning Negroes--or such Negroes as you had--to African 
countries, they would resent it. You understand. 
President: I agree with that. But we've got'em in Scandinavia and we've 
got'em in other countries, and what I want to do is enlarge 'em a little 
more. They don't have their twelve percent. Now I'm not a percentage 
man, but if we can find some of the top people in this country--I mean you 
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take either of the [unintelligible] would be wonderful ambassadors to 
some country, but top men. I would like to get'em up to where they are at 
least in walking distance of the rest of us. 
Wilkins: Exactly.56 
This exchange shows that there was serious consideration given to the issue of black 
equality at the highest levels of the government, and the image of America in the 
international arena was an important factor to consider in this movement towards 
increased rights. 
Although international pressures were effective at bringing about civil rights 
progress, it was still difficult to move forward, as the events leading up to the passage of 
both the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965 show.  As Southern 
Senators and Congressmen tried to prevent the bills from seeing the light of day, black 
activists, along with President Johnson, pushed for their passage.  It is important to note 
the tireless efforts of activists such as Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., but it is also necessary 
to understand that the U.S. government felt two distinct opposite domestic pressures, one 
for calling for change, and the other satisfied with the status quo.  Thus, it was the 
outside, international pressure that tipped the scales in favor of civil rights.         
Northern Ireland 
 
 Although Northern Ireland is not a nation unto itself like the United States, its 
history of civil rights progress follows a path similar to that of the U.S, as international 
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pressures played a key role in the movement towards equality.  The international 
pressures to secure equal rights were not present in the early twentieth century when 
violence erupted in the Easter Rising of 1916, the subsequent Irish War of Independence 
begun in 1919, or in the later Irish Civil War, and thus the repression of Catholics was 
legitimized.  In a 1919 New York Times article titled “England assailed by Irish Leaders,” 
activist groups in America lamented the fact that there was no outside pressure on 
England to end the repression of the Catholic Irish.  The nationalists had fought for their 
freedoms and liberties but only achieved half the objective, as England partitioned the 
island and claimed Northern Ireland as its own, leaving the Catholic minority there with 
few protected rights.   
The League of Nations was denounced as ‘an abomination’ . . . and ‘a 
League to prohibit peace’ by a group of speakers representing the Friends 
of Irish Freedom . . . who appeared today before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee.  They demanded that the treaty be utterly rejected, 
on the double ground that it will cause destruction of American political 
and commercial independence, and that it will prevent Ireland and other 
subject nations from obtaining their independence . . . the speakers 
denounced England and her tactics in Ireland and assailed President 
Wilson by innuendo.57 
The Times article shows that international organizations, specifically the League of 
Nations, were incapable of exerting any real influence over the situation, and although 
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there was lobbyist support in the U.S., this support did not permeate to the top levels of 
government.  President Woodrow Wilson remained relatively silent on the issue and 
refused to intervene.  As Andrew J. Wilson writes in Irish America and the Ulster 
Conflict, 1968-1995, “In April 1919, a delegation from the American Commission on 
Irish Independence arrived in Versailles to win Woodrow Wilson’s support for Irish self-
determination.  The President, however, refused to pressure Britain to recognize the Irish 
provisional government.”58 Wilson was an advocate for the League, but because it did not 
champion the Irish cause, Irish Americans did not support the international body.  
Although the League officially promoted the idea of self-determination of nations, 
“application of the principle . . . in the postwar peace settlement was limited.  It was not 
to apply to the victorious powers, [not] to the Irish in the United Kingdom, . . . or [to the] 
African-Americans in the United States.”59  Because of these reasons, England was free 
to restrict civil rights.  The Government of Ireland Act of 1920 further proved this point.   
 It is important to note before moving forward that there existed two intertwined 
and nearly inseparable conflicts in the Northern Ireland.  One, the civil rights movement, 
called for equality between Catholics and Protestants.  It denounced gerrymandering and 
the effective exclusion of Catholics from government activities among other abuses.  The 
second conflict focused on the struggle to create a united Ireland.  Although these are two 
distinct goals, the effort to unite Ireland has its roots in the movement towards equality.  
Early supporters of a united Ireland desired an end to British rule on the island so that 
they would not have to face continued repression, and the desire to unite the two areas 
                                                 
58
 Wilson, Andrew J. Irish America and The Ulster Conflict, 1968-1995. Washington D.C.: The Catholic 
University Press, 1995. p. 12. 
59
 Esman, Milton J. and Shibley Telhami, eds. International Organizations and Ethnic Conflict. Cornell 
University Press: Ithaca, 1995. p. 23. 
Escoffery 29 
was grounded in the same desires for freedom and equality that the civil rights movement 
advanced.  To illustrate this point more clearly, Sinn Féin, a political group known for its 
policy of supporting the self-determination of the Irish people, uses as its motto the 
phrase, “Building an Ireland of Equals.”60  This shows that essentially the struggle for a 
united Ireland is grounded in the struggle for basic equality.        
 Although domestic pressures grew throughout the 1960s in Northern Ireland, they 
ultimately failed to have the desired impact on the movement towards equality.  Prime 
Minister Terence O’Neill advocated change through his rhetoric and stated that he 
“wanted to build an opportunity state in which no man [would] be imprisoned by his 
environment and in which every citizen [would] have the chance to realise his full 
potential.”61  Yet, as Bob Purdie notes in Politics in the Streets, O’Neill often made 
“liberal and modernist statements and gestures, while using extreme caution in nudging 
his party towards changes its traditional outlook.”62  Because of this half-hearted attempt, 
change was unattainable through domestic means, and further domestic efforts did not 
experience success. 
 The re-defined Irish civil rights movement that emerged in the 1960s was partly 
motivated by the events occurring in the United States at the same time.  “The new 
strategy was inspired by the Black civil rights movement in the United States.  The term 
‘civil rights’ had not been used to define the aspirations of the minority community in 
Northern Ireland before the 1960s and it had never before adopted a strategy that was 
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both militant and constitutional.”63  Although this new direction appeared promising, 
some scholars have noted its ultimate failure.  Purdie writes that there were “strategic and 
tactical problems involved in transferring the model of the Black movement in the United 
Sates to Northern Ireland” as it “produc[ed] sectarian tensions, instability, conflict and 
violence” in the region.64  There existed indirect international influence in the domestic 
movement in the sense that Northern Ireland activists adopted street marches and sit-
downs, but there did not exist the necessary direct international pressure to help these 
tactics succeed.   
 Although “the first months of the civil rights campaign, non-violent and 
concentrated in Derry, aroused intense interest in the Republic of Ireland,”65 the internal 
movement ultimately sparked the violence leading to the Troubles.  In the early 1970s, 
the Parliament of Northern Ireland responded by restricting rights even further.  The 
Special Powers Act of 1971 served as emergency legislation to halt terrorist activities; it 
called for internment without trial and acted as another roadblock in the move towards 
equality.  The movement then lost some of its legitimacy as the Provisional Irish 
Republican Army resorted to terrorist tactics.  “While both wings of the IRA [Official 
and Provisional] were committed in varying degrees to the intensification of conflict, 
there were powerful forces within the Catholic community in Derry strongly opposed to 
such a development . . . [they noted that] such small highly militant groups [are not 
usually] successful to any great degree.”66  Because there was not a united front and 
violent tactics were met with heightened repression, this domestic effort failed to create 
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the desired change.  The IRA can be seen as something other than a domestic pressure, 
perhaps even an international pressure as the Provisional IRA has been, at times, 
headquartered in Dublin, but the fact that it recruited citizens of Northern Ireland and 
maintained offices throughout the six Northern counties, removes it from the strictly 
international category.  In the sixties and seventies, this militant effort failed; as Bob 
Purdie states, “At the outset the movement was supported by every shade of political 
colour, including some individual members of the Unionist Party.  In the end, the 
campaign was hijacked by the gunmen who created a new and even greater need for basic 
civil rights in Northern Ireland.”67 
 Yet, there were some positive effects of the Irish civil rights movement of the late 
1960s and early 1970s.  Irish author Niall Ó Dochartaigh stated:  
One of the most significant achievements of the civil rights campaign was 
to attract international attention to the grievances of the Catholic minority 
in Northern Ireland.  From the beginning, reports of marches in Derry 
were carried as far afield as New Zealand, Thailand, Zambia and, of 
course, Britain and the United States. The most important external 
pressure that came to bear on the Unionist government came from the 
British government at Westminster, but there were also significant 
pressures from the Republic of Ireland and, as time went on, from the 
United States.68 
A new and effective force for change, international pressure from both Britain and the 
United States, surfaced, and with this, slowly change began.  Classifying the pressures 
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included as “domestic” or “international” is admittedly difficult, because Northern 
Ireland is part of the United Kingdom, and yet at the same time, it is distinctly separate.  
Northern Ireland “remain[s] bound to Britain by the consent of [its] inhabitants, . . . [yet] 
because Northern Ireland is not fully integrated into the United Kingdom either 
constitutionally or politically, it is seen internationally as a political entity in its own right 
and not simply as a subordinate part of the United Kingdom.”69  Because of this dynamic 
relationship, the argument regarding international pressures becomes more difficult to 
pinpoint and articulate.  At times Britain was pressured to enact change in the Northern 
Ireland arena, and at other times, Britain itself acted as an outside force pressuring for 
change.  Still the overall pattern is clear: progress in civil rights came only when 
pressures for change arose from actors and influences outside Northern Ireland.   
 With the Northern Ireland Constitution Act of 1973, Britain put direct pressure on 
the acting government in Northern Ireland by suspending the Parliament, encouraging 
devolution, and declaring discrimination on the basis of religion as unlawful.  Part III of 
the document states, “Any Measure, any Act of the Parliament of Northern Ireland and 
any relevant subordinate instrument shall, to the extent that it discriminates against any 
person or class of persons on the ground of religious belief or political opinion, be 
void.”70  Britain used its force to pressure Northern Ireland to change, and in the 1970s, 
the British government also looked into potential abuses of the Special Powers Act and 
declared that previous and harmful interrogation methods of nationalist suspects were 
being stopped.71   At the same time, however, the Republic of Ireland also exerted some 
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force over the situation.  It brought a case before the European Court of Human Rights 
regarding the mistreatment of suspects held in Northern Ireland.  The court found the 
United Kingdom guilty in 1978.  “In any context, such a judgment would have been a 
grave embarrassment to the British Government, . . . [and] the case and its outcome 
exposed Britain’s vulnerability over the issue of Northern Ireland internationally.”72  This 
case shows both sides of Britain’s dilemma; on one hand it was acting with force to end 
the inequalities in Northern Ireland, and on the other, it was being pressured by outside 
governments and international organizations to do more.  Yet, in both instances, it is clear 
that international pressure regarding the issue was growing from Britain, the Republic of 
Ireland, and the European Court.   
 Like the European Court of Human Rights, the European Union played an 
important role in securing peace in the region.  In 1973 the United Kingdom joined the 
European Economic Community, later the European Union, and with this membership, 
Britain became accountable to a group of nations that supported human rights and was 
opposed to disenfranchisement of a particular group of persons.  Jonathan Stevenson 
notes in “Peace in Northern Ireland: Why Now?” that “the drive toward European 
integration and unity has eroded national borders . . . and undermined the beliefs and the 
support that gave voice and strength to Northern Ireland’s most stubborn politicians.  The 
European Union has become . . . a formidable supranational political lever.”73  Garret 
FitzGerald, the seventh Taoiseach of the Republic of Ireland and 1970s Foreign Affairs 
Minister, argued that “membership of the Community [had] a psychological impact on 
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people in both parts of Ireland because more extensive contact with other Europeans 
[made] internal differences in Ireland appear less significant.”74 
 The theme of international embarrassment for the United Kingdom from denials 
of civil rights in Northern Ireland continued to serve as a factor for progress from the 
1970s on, as Brendan O’Leary notes in The Politics of Antagonism.   He states, “The 
Soviet Union used to bring up the Northern Ireland experience to embarrass the UK: 
when British complaints about human rights in the USSR exceeded permitted diplomatic 
niceties Soviet officials raised questions about British repression in Northern Ireland and 
the jailing of innocent Irish people in Great Britain, like the Guildford Four, the 
Birmingham Six, and the Maguire Seven.”75  Not only did the Soviets recognize the 
hypocrisy of the British, but the European Convention, a body created in 1999 to develop 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, took note as well.  It stated, 
“The UK government has been found guilty of violations of the European convention on 
human rights and its officials’ treatment of suspects has led to consistent and empirically 
supported criticisms of infringements of basic civil rights.”76  Eventually though, as 
O’Leary states, Great Britain finally realized that “good relations with Northern Ireland, 
the UK, and the EEC became imperative for the success of the new economic strategy,” 
and thus the U.K. had to refine its dealings with the Roman Catholic population.77 
 American intervention through the years has also been of importance to those in 
Northern Ireland and has had a lasting effect on the rights movement as well as the peace 
process between Northern Ireland and Ireland.  As Adrian Guelke notes in Northern 
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Ireland: The International Perspective, “Outside of the British Isles the country most 
deeply involved in the Northern Ireland conflict is the United States.  Viewed from 
Northern Ireland the American dimension has assumed increasing importance in the 
conflict as is shown by the attention all parties in Northern Ireland lavish on American 
opinion.”78  American interest in the issue reaches back to the 1950s and has steadily 
grown throughout the decades, peaking with the support for the Good Friday Agreement 
in 1998.  “In 1950 the House of Representatives passed an amendment to the Foreign Aid 
Appropriation Bill to withhold all aid to Britain as long as Ireland remained 
partitioned,”79 and by the time of Jimmy Carter’s presidency, Congress began to push 
with more intensity for recognition of the Troubles in Northern Ireland.  The Department 
of State along with Congressional members O’Neill, Kennedy, and Carey in 1977 
proposed a statement regarding the Northern Ireland situation that articulated concern 
over the violence, encouraged Americans not to support the use of force, and “express[ed 
United States Government’s] willingness to join with others in seeing how additional 
investment can be encouraged in the event of a settlement.”80  The last point was noted as 
“somewhat controversial and [one that would] not make the British happy.”81  However, 
the Carter Administration maintained a policy of non-intervention unless directly 
requested from Northern Ireland officials.  When Jimmy Carter’s Secretary of State, 
Cyrus Vance, met with Irish Foreign Minister Brian Lenihan in 1977, Vance noted in a 
memo:  
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Lenihan finally raised Northern Ireland.  He maintained the present 
situation is ripe for a joint political initiative by the two sovereign 
governments concerned – Britain and Ireland. He asked that we encourage 
the British to talk with the Irish Government about such an initiative.  
Without such an initiative he said, the violence will continue and the 
political vacuum will remain, subject to exploitation by troublemakers.  (I 
made no comment to his request, consistent with our policy of not 
becoming involved unless asked by the parties.)82  
The Republic of Ireland clearly wanted international intervention and believed that 
without it, the situation would fail to improve.  Yet, although certain American actors, 
that is O’Neill, Kennedy, and the Ancient Order of the Hibernians, wanted to step in, the 
administration was still, at that time, wary of direct intervention.  
 By the 1980s, however, the U.S. government became more concerned with the 
effects of the Northern Ireland issue within in the United States.  In 1986, the FBI 
produced a report on Irish terrorism investigations in the United States, and although 
most of the document has been redacted, it does show that concern in the U.S. reached 
the level of federal agencies.  The document states, “The FBI has enjoyed significant 
accomplishments against Irish terrorism in the United States and will strive for further 
developments pointing toward, at least, substantial decline in this activity,” noting that 
since the investigations began, there had been a “precipitous decline in the number of 
                                                 
82
 U.S. Department of State. “Secretary of State Cyrus Vance provides President Jimmy Carter with his 
daily report.” Declassified Documents Reference System. Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale, 2008. Issue Date: 
18 Mar. 1980. Date Declassified: 30 Jul. 2002.  
<http://galenet.galegroup.com> 
Escoffery 37 
incidents in the United States, (51 in 1982, 31 in 1983, 13 in 1984, and 7 in 1985).”83  
Irish terrorism was beginning to impact domestic safety to some degree, and with this in 
mind, the Department of State distributed an internal memo prefacing a visit by Margaret 
Thatcher, stating that “We [the United States] welcome any action which will promote 
reconciliation of the parties in N.I.  We are encouraged by the progress in the Anglo-Irish 
dialogue and will respond positively to continuing efforts by both governments to achieve 
a peaceful solution for the sorely troubled community of N.I., [and that] the 
Administration would examine seriously any request for direct US financial assistance to 
an economic reconstruction fund for Northern Ireland.”84  The U.S. began taking greater 
steps to reach a level of peace and equality in the region.   
 International pressures on Northern Ireland increased.  The Belfast Telegraph 
reported on December 10, 1996 that “Human Rights Organisations in Britain and Ireland 
today called for a bill of human rights.”  The article states, “The Committee on the 
Administration of Justice made the appeal, along with Liberty, the Irish and Scottish 
Councils for Civil Liberty and British Irish Rights Watch . . . jointly issued a ‘Human 
Rights Challenge’ for the government [which asked for] a bill of rights for Northern 
Ireland and repeal of emergency legislation, . . . changes in policing, the strengthening of 
anti-discrimination legislation and reform of the justice system.”85  Although these 
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groups may appear to be domestic in scope, their participation in international networks 
qualifies them as international pressures.  The Irish Council for Civil Liberty holds 
membership in the International Federation of Human Rights, while the British Irish 
Rights Watch was founded by a group of people from England, Ireland, and the United 
States.  The pressure from these groups to create a bill of rights made the Protestants of 
Northern Ireland realize that they could no longer justify their repression of the Catholics 
in the international arena.  
 With the election of President Clinton, American participation in a settlement 
grew larger than ever.  In a 1998 Presidential Statement, Clinton supported the Good 
Friday Agreement, which called for the establishment of the Northern Ireland Human 
Rights Commission, the abolishment of the Government of Ireland Act of 1920, and the 
general promotion of equality between all ethnic communities.  He pointed to the 
continued U.S. assistance in the situation and said, “since 1993, [his] Administration and 
the Congress have contributed $100 million to the International Fund for Ireland, for 
Northern Ireland, and the border counties of the Republic of Ireland.”86  And in an Op-ed 
for the Belfast Telegraph in 2000, President Clinton stated, “Now is the time to reaffirm 
[the] core principles of [the Good Friday Agreement including] strict protection of 
individual human and civil rights.”87  In the same article, he also noted the benefits of 
“the 900-job call center that a Denver-based company recently announced will open in 
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north Belfast.”88  American interests in the region were not just altruistic, but economic 
as well.  Clinton saw this as a great opportunity to increase American prosperity while 
securing the future of Northern Ireland.   
Polling data from the era also shows that the American public was aware of the 
Northern Ireland issue and approved direct intervention.  When asked, “Have you read, 
seen or heard anything about the current sectarian violence between Protestants and 
Catholics in Northern Ireland?” sixty-eight percent of Gallup poll respondents replied 
yes.89  On the same day, Americans were asked, “In terms of its impact on the United 
States, how important is it to end the violence in Northern Ireland: Very important, 
somewhat important, just a little important or not at all important?”  Thirty-nine percent 
said it was very important, while thirty-six percent believed it was somewhat important.90  
Even two years later in 2002, the majority of Americans polled, seventy percent, still 
believed that a peaceful solution to the situation in Northern Ireland should be an 
important foreign policy goal of the United States.91    
American intervention in the Northern Ireland issue is still being celebrated.  
“Taoiseach Bertie Ahern made his first invention in the US presidential election 
yesterday as he firmly dismissed criticism of Hillary Clinton” as she was recently 
accused by U.S. media sources of exaggerating her involvement in the Northern Ireland 
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peace process; Ahern simply stated, “I think they’re wrong.”92  And just three days later, 
when Bill Clinton cancelled a trip to Belfast scheduled for April of 2008, “there was 
palpable disappointment . . . the appearance of Mr. Clinton at the conference was to be 
the highlight of the celebrations for the anniversary of the Good Friday Agreement.”93  
Clearly, the Irish, those in Northern Ireland as well as those in the Republic of Ireland, 
acknowledge and appreciate U.S. interventions. 
 The Good Friday Agreement served as a landmark event because it called for the 
reform of police powers, the development of the Northern Ireland Human Rights 
Commission, the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons, and the long anticipated 
ceasefire in the region.  The Agreement “affirmed the commitment to the mutual respect, 
the civil rights and the religious liberties of everyone in the community . . . [and 
articulated] the right to equal opportunity in all social and economic activity, regardless 
of class, creed, disability, gender or ethnicity” among others.94  Its development was 
integral to the progress of the Irish civil rights movement, and the international pressures 




 In the cases of the United States and Northern Ireland, judicial decisions and 
legislative actions, though promising, did not spark civil rights progress.  In the United 
States, black Americans struggled for over a century to gain the same civil rights and 
                                                 
92
 Sheahan, Fionan. “Bertie defends Hillary’s role in North peace deal.” Irish Independent. 18 Mar. 2008. p. 
8.   
93
 Smyth, Sam. “Clinton pulls out of Belfast trip.” Irish Independent. 21 Mar. 2008. p. 3.  
94
 “The Agreement: Agreement reached in the multi-party negotiations.” Cain Web Service. 3 Apr. 2008. 
<http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/agreement.htm#rights> 
Escoffery 41 
freedoms that white Americans enjoyed.  They saw the failure of the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments to secure their rights, and experienced the disheartening decision 
of Plessy v. Ferguson in the late nineteenth century.  When the Supreme Court finally 
released what seemed to be a promising decision with Brown v. Board, there was only 
disappointment, as the ruling was not fully implemented.  Yet, with the increasingly 
prominent role of America in the international arena, it became more difficult to validate 
domestic inequalities.  The U.S. felt international pressure to live up to its ideal of 
American democracy, especially as Cold War tensions erupted in the middle of the 
twentieth century.  Although one cannot ignore the important work of civil rights activists 
over the years, their work gained more prominence as international institutions and 
nations around the world began examining the U.S. situation.  With outside pressure, 
there existed a new sense of accountability.   
 Similarly, the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland experienced repression by the 
Protestant majority and called for equality.  The Catholics denounced gerrymandering, 
discrimination in housing, and discrimination in employment.  Although they tried to 
seek recourse in the courts, they met with failure.  The largely Protestant courts turned 
out rulings unsympathetic to the Catholic population, and the various statutes in existence 
made few protections for them either.  However, the seemingly hopeless movement 
found new vigor with the rising international interest in the situation.  Britain, the United 
States, and Ireland, as well as international bodies such as the European Union, pressured 
the region to alter its treatment of the minority population. Under this pressure, Northern 
Ireland began to implement changes like the Fair Employment Act of 1989, which stated 
that employers could not discriminate on the basis of religion.  The Irish across the island 
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still celebrate the work of the U.S. in the area, and credit international standards and 
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